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Organizational Narcissism
Dennis Duchon, University of Tennessee.
Michael Burns, University of Texas at San Antonio
Abstract
In order to protect their identities, organizations can become self-obsessed and display extreme narcissistic behaviors, which will, in the long run, lead to decline. Extreme narcissism can take two forms. The high self-esteem narcissistic organization institutionalizes an exalted sense of self-worth and becomes blind to its weaknesses. The low
self-esteem narcissistic organization institutionalizes a profound sense of unworthiness and becomes blind to its own
strengths. In between the extremes an organization can remain reality-based and institutionalize a healthy sense of
self-worth and value. Enron exhibited many characteristics of the high self-esteem narcissistic organization, while
Salomon Brothers exhibited characteristics of the low self-esteem narcissistic organization. Both organizations failed.
Liz Claiborne has prospered because it demonstrates characteristics of the reality-based, healthy narcissist.

is the collection of central and enduring attributes
that make an organization unique and distinguishable from its competitors. Expressed through policies, procedures, and behaviors, the organization’s
identity reflects the values and beliefs that lie at its
core. Wal-Mart and Sears, both mass market retailers, look different, feel different, and their employees behave differently because the companies project different identities.
Organizations, like people, are motivated to protect their identities and they do this by rewarding
behaviors that will sustain a positive sense of self
and reduce collective anxieties. The effort to protect identity can become fixated on relieving anxiety, and when this happens, the identity itself takes
on the qualities of narcissism.
Narcissism is a term that describes a person who
is self-absorbed. A narcissist displays a sense of
self-importance, fantasizes obsessively about success and power, assumes a strong sense of uniqueness, lacks empathy, and often exploits or takes
advantage of others. These behaviors protect the
narcissist’s identity and fragile self-esteem.
Entire organizations can also become self-absorbed
and focus on protecting an identity that has taken on
narcissistic qualities. Every organization develops
distinctive preferences, commitments, and practices
that reflect collectively shared assumptions or ide-

The headquarters for Wal-Mart, the world’s largest company, are set in a commercial strip on the
edge of a small town in northwest Arkansas. The
five and dime Sam Walton started is preserved as
a company visitor’s center.
The Sears Holdings corporate headquarters occupies a 200-acre campus (that) … offers natural
prairie lands, ponds and waterfalls, walking/jogging paths and athletic fields. The facility offers
award-winning food service, coffee shops, childcare, wellness and fitness centers, automotive
center, sample store, hair salon, sundry shop,
bank, insurance agency, pharmacy, box office,
dry cleaner and concierge services.

W

al-Mart takes great pride in its folksy roots,
and its lack of ostentatious display is a conscious decision about how to present its identity.
By preserving the five and dime, Wal-Mart is saying something important about what the company
is and how it operates. In contrast, the Sears Holdings’ sleek campus and its array of amenities make
a statement about the company’s identity, its sense
of self as a modern, progressive company.
All organizations have identities much the way
all people have identities. An organization’s identity develops over time as it adapts to both environmental and internal pressures, and what emerges
354
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ologies about its identity, and the organization will
reward people who best manifest that identity. These
identity-capturing behaviors once reinforced will be
imitated by others and so, over time, become institutionalized. We argue in this paper that extreme forms
of organizational narcissism can harm organizations
and even destroy them.
The extreme narcissistic organization becomes
preoccupied with itself and its anxieties, and loses
touch with its clients and markets. Self-absorption
becomes an everyday practice, and the organization uses self-aggrandizement, a sense of entitlement,
and denial to project what has become an extreme
narcissistic identity. Self-aggrandizement, entitlement, and denial replace rational, reality-based
decision-making.
For example, the once successful hedge fund
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) triggered a financial panic by accumulating $4.6 billion in debt between May and September 1998,
and only an intervention by Federal Reserve Bank
saved it from collapse. The company’s crisis was
caused not by poor talent or a lack of information,
but rather by its own narcissism. LTCM’s partners collectively displayed self-aggrandizement
by believing that they possessed knowledge and
capabilities far beyond those of any other hedgefund managers. They collectively saw themselves
as both omnipotent and omniscient in that they
believed their method of “Value at Risk” calculations allowed them to predict and control the
future. This collective sense of entitlement led
the partners to take enormous investment risks
in areas such as the Russian economy in which it
had no previous experience. Between January and
August 1998 LTCM’s leverage ratio reached 50:1
(when 2:1 was the industry norm), and it had offbalance-sheet positions worth an additional $1.25
trillion. Even as the markets collapsed around
them, the partners denied the reality of their precarious situation and instead were driven to prove
LTCM’s identity of superiority and dominance.
Extreme organizational narcissism takes two
forms, based either on high or low self-esteem. A
third form of narcissism we call healthy narcissism characterizes organizations that protect their
identities by being self-confident, not self-aggrandizing, that earn success rather than believe them-
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selves entitled to it, and that use data to inform
rather then deny. Examples of high self-esteem
narcissism, low self-esteem narcissism and healthy
narcissism appear in Enron, Salomon Brothers, and
Liz Claiborne companies, respectively. Analysis of
these companies reveals the unique behaviors they
employ to protect their identities.
Extreme organizational narcissism
An organization in the grip of extreme narcissism loses sight of the “reality” of its position in
the marketplace and employs denial, self-aggrandizement, and a sense of entitlement to prop up its
damaged sense of identity. For example, the organization denies facts about itself through spokespeople, press releases, and annual reports. It develops plausible and acceptable justifications for its
actions through rationalization. An extreme narcissistic organization self-aggrandizes by endowing itself with a sense of rightness, and by making claims of its uniqueness even in the face of contradictory evidence. This is accomplished in several ways. For example, the organization commissions flattering corporate histories, executives
make speeches embedded with claims of uniqueness, and it deploys office layouts and architecture as expressions of status, prestige, and vanity. An extreme narcissistic organization takes on a
sense of entitlement that is accompanied by a lack
of empathy and a willingness to exploit others. It
assumes that it is entitled to continued success, and
can exploit resources, people, and other organizations in the service of that success.
Such extreme self-absorption, however, will take
on different manifestations depending on whether
the organization is a high self-esteem or low selfesteem narcissist. Essentially, the high self-esteem
narcissistic organization is characterized by excessive self-esteem, an exalted sense of self, and
becomes blind to its weaknesses. In contrast, the
low self-esteem organization suffers from a profound sense of inferiority and becomes blind to its
strengths. In either case, the self-absorbed organization is no longer reality-based, and an identity
that had once provided a competitive advantage
turns into a competitive disadvantage.

Stories emphasize effective problem
solving
Stories emphasize great mistakes avoided
Stories emphasize great triumphs won

Characteristic employee behavior is open,
inclusive

Characteristic employee behavior is
brash, boastful, preening

Risks carefully considered
Indecisive/no risks: bet nothing

Characteristic employee behavior is
secretive, hand wringing
Decisive/high risks: bet the company

Corp headquarters show pride of place

Corp headquarters hidden within
landscape, walls, gates; architecture
conveys detachment, isolation; security
systems prominently displayed;
need for security exaggerated; staff
wear dowdy clothing; might require
uniforms, lab coats

Mindful assessment of situation
Projects alienation, dissatisfaction

Core assumption: grandiose fantasies of
success

Kurt Eichenwald’s book “Conspiracy of Fools”
(2005) provides an inside view of an organization
that seems, in retrospect, obsessed with its own
undoing. “Crime was just one ingredient in a toxic
stew (of) shocking incompetence, unjustified arrogance, compromised ethics, and an utter contempt
for the market’s judgment,” Eichenwald reports,
“Ultimately it was Enron’s tragedy to be filled with

Self-aggrandizement: tendency to
overestimate (underestimate)
merits and accomplishments:
overestimate one’s importance, power,
reputation

Anxiety of mythic proportions

Projects heroic, all-powerful, mythic
entity

The Enron Corporation’s bankruptcy in 2001,
the subsequent prosecution of many of its top executives, and the demise of its auditing firm Arthur
Andersen, has become a cautionary tale in American business: even the mighty can fall quickly.
Extreme high self-esteem narcissism was a central
and enduring trait at Enron, and this trait informed
commonly shared assumptions about what constituted acceptable, appropriate, even necessary
behavior. Institutionalized narcissism enabled
unethical and illegal practices.

Table 1. Manifestations of Organizational Narcissism

Enron: an example of high self-esteem
narcissism

High Self-esteem Narcissism; Exalted
Sense of Worth; It Loves Itself Too
Much; Is Blind to Its Weaknesses

Low Self-esteem Narcissism; Profound
Sense of Unworthiness; It Hates Itself
Too Much; Is Blind to Its Strengths

Table 1 presents the differences between high
self-esteem and low self-esteem narcissistic organizations in terms of entitlement, self-aggrandizement, and denial. Table 1 also presents the characteristics of a “healthy” narcissistic organization: one that is reality-based, open to feedback
and self-respecting. Table 1 is illustrative rather
than exhaustive, and offers a framework for
diagnosing/explaining organizational health or
dysfunction.
For example, Long Term Capital Management
exhibited the collective behaviors of high selfesteem narcissism. In contrast, the FBI near the end
of J. Edgar Hoover’s life exhibited the qualities of a
low self-esteem narcissistic organization.
Below we analyze three different organizations in terms of their organizational narcissism
traits.

Characteristic reaction to anxiety

Healthy Narcissism; Reality Based;
Aware of Strengths; Aware of
Weaknesses

High and low self-esteem narcissism
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Corp headquarters designed by famous
architects, attention-grabbing
architecture conveys wealth, energy,
excitement; lavishly decorated offices;
expensive art; private dining rooms,
private jets, expensive parties, sponsor
professional sports teams; staff wear
hip, fashionable clothing

in

Core assumption: aspirations of success,
concern for mistakes

Duchon & Burns

Core assumption: fear of failure
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Denial: inability or refusal to acknowledge
problems

Entitlement: sense of having the right to
use/exploit situations/people

Environmental scanning too confusing,
threatening
Re-package disconfirming evidence
Discussing opportunities seen as naïve
Contrary opinions are dismissed as
“uninformed”
Managers surround themselves with
doomsayers; doomsayers celebrated as
prudent

Environmental scanning not necessary
(omniscience)
Ignore disconfirming evidence
Admitting to “problems” is seen as
weakness
Contrary opinions are publicly shouted
down
Managers surround themselves with “yes”
people; “suck-ups” celebrated as team
players

Language emphasizes the need to avoid
failure, the dangers that lurk, the
problems that will be encountered

Language emphasizes the “rightness,”
the “deservedness” of success

Core assumption: the data (or feedback)
can’t be trusted

Values obsession with rules

Values entrepreneurial style

Core assumption: the data (or feedback)
are wrong

Project the illusion of victimization with
avoidance behaviors

Project the illusion of control with
boisterous, exhibitionistic behavior

Employees characterized by jealousy of
each other

Exploit with passive-aggression

Exploit with aggression

Employees routinely over-represent their
status

Core assumption: we don’t deserve
success

Low Self-esteem Narcissism; Profound
Sense of Unworthiness; It Hates Itself
Too Much; Is Blind to Its Strengths

Core assumption: we deserve to be
successful

High Self-esteem Narcissism; Exalted
Sense of Worth; It Loves Itself Too
Much; Is Blind to Its Weaknesses

Table 1. Manifestations of Organizational Narcissism (continued)

Managers surround themselves with
talent

Contrary opinions sought as way to
balance

Both opportunities and problems must be
seen for what they are

Seek out disconfirming evidence

Environmental scanning is important
source of data

Core assumption: the data (or feedback)
are an important source of information

Employees respect/acknowledge each
other’s accomplishments

Language emphasizes sense of
community and shared destiny

Respect people; values inclusiveness

Project a sense of respect and fairmindedness

We don’t exploit

Core assumption: we can earn success

Healthy Narcissism; Reality Based;
Aware of Strengths; Aware of
Weaknesses

Organizational Narcissism
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people smart enough to know how to maneuver
around the rules, but not wise enough to understand why the rules had been written in the first
place.” Those people were “not wise” because they
were operating in an extreme narcissistic environment that encouraged displays of entitlement, celebrated self-aggrandizement, and systematically
denied that anything was out of order.
We are Entitled to Success
People at Enron skirted the rules because the
“rules” didn’t apply to them: the message was that
the people at Enron were entitled to success and
riches. Consider that market-trading prices did not
dictate the value of contracts at Enron. Instead, the
company created and used its own projections for
anticipated income. Fees were treated as a return
on investment. Such a calculation lowered capital investment costs and artificially raised returns.
No one objected to this practice. Conflicts of interest were of little concern. For example, the finance
group created its own little world where buyers
(i.e., the clients they represented) worked hard to
protect the interest of sellers (i.e., Enron). The company side-stepped conventional accounting practices when it seemed profitable to do so. For example, Enron devised its own variation of Mark
to Market accounting such that contracts were
assigned the value of anticipated future profits,
not current market prices. That the future profits
might not actually be realized didn’t matter. Enron
believed itself entitled to a healthy-looking balance
sheet.
Self-aggrandizing Fantasies of Success
Enron saw itself changing the world, and executives and employees were not shy about making sure that the world was aware of the changes.
Boasting and bragging became institutionalized.
For example, executives often spoke with messianic fervor about the new order they hoped to create: they were going to take power away from the
monopolies, finance the dying gas industry, and
create new markets that didn’t exist before. Jeffrey
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Skilling’s group liked to show off. They liked being
known as the best and the brightest—analysts
who tore apart the company in search of excessive
risks and the associated high returns. The group
indulged themselves with flashy, sleek offices that
were meant to symbolize the smart, gifted people
they believed themselves to be. Others in the company did not shy away from exhibitionism: private jets and expensive parties were a normal part
of the Enron’s self-display. In 1999, Enron attracted
further attention to itself by paying $100 million
for the naming rights to the Houston Astros new
stadium.

Denial: The Data are Wrong
A sense of entitlement and a need to self-aggrandize become exaggerated over time because a narcissistic organization practices a collective form
of denial. The feedback loop is severed and any
evidence that might threaten the organization’s
self-regard is never “seen” or is simply ignored.
Most egregiously, the company ignored evidence
of fraud and insider trading for years, and later
denied responsibility for such practices. Top executives were seen to surround themselves with yesmen who were careful not to pass along bad news.
International project development businesses routinely presented absurdly inflated project values
and used improper accounting as a cover-up. One
executive tried to share his concerns about such
behavior with CEO Ken Lay. Within minutes he
was ushered out the door and never heard anything back.
Denial was an important aspect of Enron’s participation in the catastrophic Dabhol Power Project in India. The project was so large and politically complicated that the company decided it
needed former Secretary of State James Baker as a
consultant. Baker proved to be less than enthusiastic about the project, and his report raised many
red flags, particularly about the Indian government’s lack of commitment. The report was filed
away and largely forgotten. However, most of
the dangers Baker warned about materialized: a
newly elected Indian government refused to sup-
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port Dabhol. The project was on the chopping
block as Secretary Baker predicted, yet no one in
the company had seen (or was willing to accept)
the possibility of such an outcome. Instead of a
prudent retreat, however, the company decided
to double its bet on India, a move celebrated in
Houston as a grand slam homerun. As is the
norm in high esteem narcissistic organizations,
the risks of such a rash move were hardly considered After all, the international division’s projections said Dabhol was a sure winner. Never mind
that all the previous projections about Dabhol had
been off the mark: the company was in denial.
Altogether, Enron lost about $900 million on the
project.
Salomon brothers: an example of low
self-esteem narcissism
In contrast to the grandiose, exhibitionistic behaviors found in a high self-esteem narcissistic organization, the low self-esteem narcissistic organization is characterized by an environment that is selfdenying, secretive, and projects a profound sense
of unworthiness. See Table 1.
Anxiety and alienation
Michael Lewis’s book “Liar’s Poker” (1990) provides an insider’s account of the low self-esteem
environment at investment bank Salomon Brothers. While investment banking is an occupation not
generally associated with low self-esteem behavior,
the example applies here because Salomon Brothers seems to have been different. “Salomon was,
in 1985, a profitable company as a result of dealing in bonds (but not junk bonds),” Lewis writes.
“[Before deregulation], Wall Street had been content to let Salomon Brothers be the best bond traders because that was considered neither profitable
nor prestigious. What was profitable was raising
capital. What was prestigious was knowing lots of
corporate CEOs. Salomon was a social and financial outlier.”
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Deregulation threw the company off-track.
Instead of objectively analyzing opportunities and
threats, the Salomon Brothers Lewis writes about
became obsessed with its own anxieties. The organization projected a profound sense of unworthiness which hardened into a kind of cynicism that
was used to justify unethical behavior. In 1991 Salomon Brothers was caught trying to acquire more
U.S. Treasury bonds than was legally allowed. The
scandal, combined with a fine that was the largest ever imposed on an investment bank up to that
time, proved to be the company’s undoing.
“Salomon Brothers was at the crossroads of
change,” Lewis writes, “but all the time wearing
a blindfold. It lacked an accurate vision of where
the explosion in the bond market would lead (and)
from 1985 onward it took what must be one of
the most expensive and fanciful commercial rides
in the history of the American corporation.” Each
problem, instead of being seen as an opportunity
for reform and change, only reinforced a sense of
unworthiness and inevitable doom, a sense that
was fulfilled because Salomon got itself into legal
difficulties and ceased operating as an independent company in 1991.
Self-denying: Fear of Failure
Instead of over-estimating itself the way Enron did,
Salomon Brothers systematically underestimated
itself by projecting an image as social nonentities.
For example, a top executive told the following
self-deprecating story during a training session: At
cocktail parties lovely ladies would corner me and
ask my opinion of the market, but, alas, when they
learned I was a bond man, they would quietly drift
away. The training relentlessly stressed that people keep their heads down: the quickest way to be
fired was to appear in the press boasting. Even successful people were expected to undervalue their
accomplishments. One successful trader explained
his success by noting that “… in the land of the
blind the one-eyed man is king.”
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We Don’t Deserve Success
Because Salomon Brothers’ identity is characterized by low self-esteem, its presentation will be
different, almost entirely opposite, from Enron’s
presentation. For example, entitlement at Enron
meant that the company and its managers acted
as if they were entitled to success and special
accommodations in the marketplace. The inwardfocus at Salomon Brothers meant that the company and its managers expected success to elude
them and they turned their frustrations on themselves. They acted out by enforcing a regime
of terror and abuse; a corporate version of coming home mad and kicking the dog. Bond traders
ruled the shop, and their tyranny over salesmen
was institutionalized. A favorite trick was starting rumors that all the sales people were going
to be fired. Analysts were expected to be working all the time; they rarely slept and often looked
ill. It seemed the better they got at their jobs, the
nearer they appeared to death. A kind of protection game emerged where the weak sought to find
favor and protection from the strong who were, of
course, the biggest bullies. Management assumed
seigniorial privileges. Their offices on the 41st
floor were served by private elevators, and communication was accomplished over the phone. A
staff person on the 40th floor was no closer to his/
her manager than a staff person in Dallas. The
company felt no loyalty to its staff. You want loyalty, one staff member noted, hire a cocker spaniel. Everyone felt entitled to treat customers with
disdain. “I spent much of my time inventing logical lies,” Lewis notes, “Most of the time when
markets move, no one had any idea why. A man
who can tell a good story can make a good living
as a broker.”
Denial: The Data Can’t Be Trusted
Enron practiced denial in order not to pay attention to reality and thus continue disastrous,
often illegal, practices. At Salomon Brothers,
denial was used to justify managerial paralysis.
In both cases, the feedback loop was severed or
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ignored, but Salomon Brothers turned on itself.
“The plain fact,” Lewis writes, “was that a combination of market forces and gross mismanagement had thrown Salomon Brothers into deep
trouble. At times it was as if we had no management at all. No one put a stop to the infighting;
no one gave a sense of direction … no one wanted
to make the hard decisions that business men,
like generals, simply have to make.” Denial also
took the form of scape-goating. The bosses were
inclined to blame their lieutenants for poor execution of a brilliant plan rather than question the
plan itself. The “grunts,” Lewis notes, were better able to diagnose the company’s problems than
the “generals.” Sales people who spent all day on
the phone with customers saw drastic changes in
the market to which management was blind, but
one could not attempt to persuade management
of this sad fact. Its response would have been to
shoot the messenger. Lewis seems to be describing a organization that is arguing about rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic rather than face the
reality of a sinking ship.
The point with both the Enron and Salomon
Brothers examples is that extreme narcissism will
produce such a dysfunctional work environment
that legal troubles and business failure are easily predictable outcomes, even if that business had
once enjoyed great success and acclaim. Also, the
examples show that reactions to collective anxiety take on a different presentation depending on
whether the extreme narcissism is characterized by
high self-esteem or low self-esteem.

Liz Claiborne: Healthy narcissism
As presented in Table 1 it is possible to see that a
form of functional narcissism resides somewhere
between the extremes. The organization that manages to avoid narcissistic extremes can be said to
be a healthy narcissist. Such organizations are
reality-based and, overtime, show themselves
to be worthy of trust and reliance. An organiza-

Organizational Narcissism

tion with a healthy, authentic sense of self-values knowledge and awareness rather than denial,
seeks justice and fair play rather than entitlement,
and encourages self-confidence rather than selfaggrandizement. Healthy organizational narcissism enhances and builds the value of others in
the organization and seeks to maximize benefits
for the largest number of people without exploitation. Such an organization can value and reward
high performance, but not become overly exhibitionistic about doing so. Certainly, healthy narcissistic organizations are subject to uncertainties and anxieties, they make mistakes, but are
better able to cope with and adapt to these pressures than extreme narcissistic organizations. A
healthy narcissistic organization shows resilience.
As a metaphor, the extreme high self-esteem narcissist loves itself too much and is blind to its own
weaknesses. The low self-esteem narcissist hates
itself too much and is blind to its own strengths.
The healthy narcissist is aware of and proud of its
strengths and, at the same time, it is aware of and
tries to overcome its weaknesses.
Mindful assessment
The healthy narcissistic organization remains factoriented and tries to discover the “truth” of a situation by examining both supporting and disconfirming evidence. The healthy organization is open
to the possibility that it enjoyed a success because
of luck, or a failure because of its own mistakes. A
healthy organization’s identity will not be unduly
threatened by a short term failure because it possesses a healthy confidence that it will succeed in
the long term. Because it is reality-based, a healthy
organization will be much more open to change
than its dysfunctional counterparts.
For example, under the leadership of Jack
Welch, General Electric exhibited healthy narcissistic behaviors and experienced success that proved
to be beneficial to shareholders and most stakeholders. To be sure, working as a manager for GE
was not necessarily pleasant because the company
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so valued performance that a kind of Darwinian
survival of the fittest model informed decisionmaking. Yet the performance driven environment
did not have room for denial because managers
had to take responsibility and be open to bad news
in order to keep their operations on track. Yes-people were not rewarded, and although it was a competitive environment, it was also a transparent one
where excessive self-aggrandizing and entitlement
would not have flourished.
Consider how the healthy narcissism at Liz
Claiborne has kept the company on-track first
through its years of rapid growth, and then it
was able to rebound in the late 1990s following a
sharp decline in both sales and profits. The company designs and markets branded women’s and
men’s apparel, fragrances, and accessories. It
was founded in 1976 by Liz Claiborne, her husband Al Ortenberg, and two other partners, and
enjoyed great success from its inception. The company went public in 1981 and, in 1986, became the
first on the Fortune 500 list founded by a woman.
Beginning in 1992, however, the company was
unable to respond effectively to market changes
and it suffered a three-year decline where its market capitalization fell from $3.5 billion to $1.2 billion. Management instituted a series of operational and marketing changes, and the market
capitalization rebounded to $3.2 billion by 1997.
By 2007 company sales approached $5 billion.
While the company has benefited from marketing and supply chain innovations, our argument is that the company’s healthy narcissism
played an important role both in its growth and
its ability to respond to market changes. In contrast, Salomon Brothers, because of its low selfesteem narcissism, was able neither to recognize
nor respond to changes in its industry. A healthy
narcissist protects its identity by remaining reality based, and it does not fall prey to denial or
engage in excessive displays of entitlement or
self-aggrandizement.
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Aspire To Success Rather Than Self-aggrandize

Not Denying: We Need The Data

The company did not seem to be one that was
either overly self-aggrandizing or self-denying. For
example, company headquarters were housed in a
stylish but not, in comparison to Enron, overly lavish building near Times Square in New York City.
The building’s décor features clean lines, lots of
pure white, and is not ostentatious or attentiongrabbing. While the staff’s attire was not “button
down,” they tended to dress in Liz Claiborne fashions. Executives avoided the limelight and gave
interviews to the press strictly for business reasons.
In many ways the company’s sense of self-esteem
and lack of vanity reflected its core merchandising principle: Liz Claiborne produced stylish (but
not too trendy) clothes that actually fit working
women.

A reality-based organization is one where people face the facts of their situation and accept
responsibility. It does not enable the use of
denial to avoid the facts or evade responsibility.
For example, the Liz Claiborne company always
took pride in listening to its customers. In 1987 it
tried to re-introduce mini-skirt fashions, a concept that consumers rejected, so it was quickly
withdrawn. The company took pride in claiming
that it would not participate in the exploitation of
poor laborers. Nonetheless, in 1984, evidence surfaced among international human rights groups
that a Liz Claiborne contractor was using a knitting mill in China where employees received no
more that sixty-one cents an hour, if they were
paid at all. Instead of making excuses or stonewalling, the company acknowledged its responsibility and severed ties with the offending contractor. In analyzing the company’s difficulties in the
early 1990s, company executives took ownership
of the fact that their product lines had gotten stale
and the company, as a whole had grown complacent. A reality-based organization also knows that
understanding “reality” requires understanding
different points of view. Liz Claiborne expanded
membership on both its Operating Committee and its Executive Committee specifically to
ensure that different “realities” were represented.
Denial is difficult to sustain in a heterogeneous
environment.
The reality-based healthy narcissism at Liz Claiborne contrasts sharply with the high self-esteem
narcissism at Enron where executives refused to
“see” that many of their routine business practices were not just unethical, but were illegal. The
low self-esteem narcissism at Salomon Brothers
allowed executives to deny that their industry had
changed.

Success Is Earned, Not An Entitlement
Liz Claiborne has not enabled a sense of entitlement. Rather, the founders systematically developed an identity that prized teamwork and egalitarianism. Everyone mattered and enjoyed the
benefit of friendly interpersonal relations, something that would not be possible in an organization characterized by rigidly defined privileges for
the few. Liz Claiborne was run as a business, and it
enforced a kind of business discipline on the staff
that contrasted sharply with the “prima donna”
companies commonly found in the fashion industry. For example, both executives and design staff
routinely rode together to fitting sessions in a company van. The company as a whole did not feel it
was entitled to special privileges. Rather, it took
care to cultivate good relations with its suppliers, and even when its clout in the industry might
have allowed it to demand special consideration,
Liz Claiborne had a reputation for being fair with
its off-shore contractors: they didn’t oversample,
didn’t withdraw orders, and didn’t make prototypes in one factory then bring it to someone else
for production.

Final comments
An organization’s identity makes tangible the collectively shared values and assumptions that help
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employees understand who they are as a group,
how they got that way, and how they should
behave. The distinctiveness of an identity can contribute to an organization’s competitive advantage, and this has been true for Liz Claiborne. In
both good times and bad, a collective healthy sense
of self-esteem and an identity that is reality based
provided both an anchor in the present and a compass to the future.
Recognizing that Liz Claiborne’s identity can be
characterized as healthy narcissism underscores
the idea that, in a sense, every organization is nar-
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cissistic. Every organization believes it possesses
special capabilities; every organization seeks favorable publicity; every organization will at times
ignore unfavorable events; top decision makers in
every organization occasionally make bad decisions that they don’t want to own up to. But occasional describes the normal, not the extreme. In
the extreme case, healthy self-regard morphs into
unhealthy self-obsession, and the reality base is
lost. The grandiose, exhibitionistic narcissism at
Enron and the inhibited, self-denying narcissism at
Salomon Brothers resulted in system failure.
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